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Communications 
To T H E E D I T O R S : 
Stuart Levine's review of my book, Technological Utopianism in 
American Culture (March 1986), so misrepresents and oversimpli-
fies its contents as, I believe, to warrant a reply. 
Contrary to Levine's summary, I discuss all twenty-five techno-
logical Utopians in my third chapter (pp. 45-55) and not only in the 
appendix, which provides additional biographical information not 
suitable for the text. Unlike Elmer Suderman's 1961 Kansas dis-
sertation, with which Levine compares my book, I am concerned 
with Utopian writings not as isolated texts but as expressions o f the 
views held by many Americans at the time. For this explicit reason 
(pp. 32, 165), which Levine fails to see, I put some of the biograph-
ical information at the end. Levine is a literary critic. I am a 
historian. 
Again contrary to Levine, I discuss all of the Utopian works in 
my second chapter (pp. 19-32) and scarcely use "Looking Backward 
to stand for them all." Of course the works "are identical in impor-
tant respects": by what other logical criterion would I be justified 
in grouping them together? I do note minor differences (pp. 19, 
32), but if other relevant differences are more important than the 
similarities, I would be eager to learn what they are. 
I do not organize my book around Eugene Ferguson's undeniably 
seminal 1962 article because I am concerned less with the origins 
of American "know-how," as Ferguson was, than with its logical 
extension a century later as technological utopianism. Once again, 
Levine fails to see my explicit intent (p. vii). 
Similarly, I spend time defining my terms because they have 
frequently been either loosely defined or left undefined. "Technol-
ogy," "utopianism," and "ideology" have often been used as either 
buzz words or slogans. Levine continually rebukes me for waxing 
too "abstract," but to the extent I do so it is because I am concerned 
with concepts: I am writing about the effect of the idea of techno-
logical utopianism on American culture. For this reason Levine 
wholly misses the point of my disagreement with Leo Marx: w e are 
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To T H E E D I T O R S : 
Mr. Segal misunderstands what was intended as a friendly if 
critical review. To the extent that the review can be misunderstood, 
I owe him an apology, and ask him to look more closely at what I 
actually wrote. In saying that Technological Utopianism had "for-
givable weaknesses," I was sincere. I am glad to hear that his 
publishers consultants liked the manuscript; had I been one of 
them, I also would have recommended publication, though I would 
have urged the editors to help him present his ideas more effec-
tively. My review said that he was sharp, that he knew his topic, 
contesting less the evidence itself than its ideological significance. 
Consequently, Levine's reduction of my latter chapters to the no-
tion that "life is crummy in modern America" indicts itself: I am 
concerned with the contemporary reaction to the failure of the 
Utopians' predictions, not simply with the failure itself. I am most 
concerned with the impact of that failure on modern Americans' 
thinking. 
Levine's faulting me for "arbitrarily" using the European Thomas 
Carlyle's "Signs of the Times" rather than Emerson's writings when 
discussing the American Timothy Walker's "Defense of Mechanical 
Philosophy" simply reveals his ignorance: Walker's essay was an 
explicit reply to Carlyle's views, not to Emerson's, and I make this 
repeatedly clear (pp. 81-87). Emerson is not germane to me here 
just because he is germane to Levine elsewhere. 
Levine berates the University of Chicago Press for its poor edi-
torial policies. I can assure Levine that my book did not get pub-
lished without the enthusiastic support of established outside re-
viewers, who were considerably more careful in reviewing my 
manuscript than he was in reviewing my book. 
Finally, I am sorry that, despite my extensive search for all 
pertinent secondary sources, Levine's own "articles on the impact 
of technological change on writers and artists" never surfaced. If I 
wanted, like him, to engage in mean ad hominem arguments about 
motives, I would suggest that my failure to cite him prompts his 
ill-spirited remarks. 
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that, commendably, he connected it to the work of other scholars 
and to larger issues, and that the book was "fruitful"—that is, that 
it suggested further applications and relationships. 
I observed that there was not much close analysis of the twenty-
five Utopian writers, but figured that this was because the material 
was not in itself terribly revealing, perhaps because it expressed 
ideas which were already widely accepted. Mr. Segal says as much 
on page 102: "As we have seen, there was limited need for multiple 
declarations of the gospel of progress and of progress as technolog-
ical progress." I am not, as we shall see, the only reviewer who felt 
the book too thin in "close analysis of individual texts," but I 
assumed that this was, as Mr. Segal writes in his objection, because 
the works were "identical in important respects." More an obser-
vation than a criticism—the book left my curiosity about this lit-
erature a little unsatisfied. 
Similarly, when I noted that "Segal could have organized his 
entire book around the relationship between his utopias and the 
tendencies that [Eugene] Ferguson was the first to recognize," I 
meant exactly what I said—"could have," not "should have." I was 
making a favorable observation about the richness of the topic, 
which ties to so many aspects of nineteenth-century American life 
that Segal could have organized the book in any of a number of 
ways. I was critical of organization, but even there blamed not Mr. 
Segal, but his editors. Of this more later. 
I quite agree that he was not obliged to connect Emerson to 
Walker just because I find the subject interesting. H e is of course 
right about the special connection between Walker and Carlyle. I 
meant to be helpful, because Emerson connects sensationally well, 
and readers of this journal have special interest in Emerson. Per-
haps Mr. Segal missed what I intended in reactions of this sort: 
they are part of a general argument, summarized toward the top of 
page 143 in my review: "Thus Segal's study, though very special-
ized, is germane to scholars of New England culture." That was to 
recommend it. I tried to illustrate other connections which Tech-
nological Utopianism had suggested to me. Pretty high praise, 
really, to say that a book is "fruitful"; this means that its ideas bear 
other ideas. There is no implied criticism that given ideas did not 
occur to the author. 
I don't quite follow Mr. Segal's argument about the Suderman 
dissertation. Suderman does not view the religious novels merely 
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as "isolated texts." His dissertation is a very different document in 
its method from Segal's book, for while Segal leaves readers itching 
for more evidence so they can judge for themselves, Suderman if 
anything overwhelms with evidence. I think that Suderman would 
be the first to agree that it would have taken pruning and editing 
to turn his solid dissertation into an effective book. That is the point 
that I was making: good theses, not good books. Needed reorga-
nization, good editorial advice. What is commendable in the work 
of both scholars is that they have thought about the connections 
between their evidence and larger issues. 
My treatment of Segal's engagement with Leo Marx's ideas is 
not very negative, either. The strange organization of the study, I 
say, makes the reader fear that Segal is not going to connect his 
work to formulations by major scholars of larger issues. But I re-
assure readers that in fact he does so finally. I'll stick by my argu-
ment that Mr. Segal did not display enough of his evidence to 
enable one to judge whether his suggested modifications of Marx's 
"middle landscape" are justified, but I was very pleased to see the 
discussion, and will retain an open mind. I even tried to reconcile 
one apparent disagreement between the two points of view. 
I will stick also to what I said about the thinness of evidence in 
Technological Utopianism, though when I said that Mr. Segal was 
apparently using Looking Backward to stand for others, I did not 
mean to complain. Since Looking Backward is well known, I was 
willing to take Mr. Segal's word that the important things that are 
true about it for his argument are true about the others as well. I 
have no quarrel with what he says about his concern with concepts. 
I do think that we need more evidence to make the discussion of 
concepts convincing. I found myself unable to judge the validity of 
certain conclusions because the author hadn't given me enough 
sense of what was in the works under discussion. None of this says 
anything bad about Mr. Segal. 
I have searched through my review for evidence that I criticized 
Mr. Segal for not making use of things that I've written. I just can't 
find any. The quotation in the angry last paragraph of his response 
is not from my review, but from the little biographical sentence 
which follows it. I'm not sure, either, what he means by "mean ad 
hominem arguments about motives." I did say that "thesis authors 
are thrilled to get their tomes into print"; I know I would have 
been. That is not mean; it's kind and friendly, part of my argument 
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that the faults are "forgivable" and more to be blamed on editors 
than author: "Chicago editors did a bright author a disservice by 
letting the present book through in this form." 
I guess that I could be angry about Segal's (ad hominem?) state-
ment at the end of his second paragraph ("Levine is a literary critic. 
I am a historian"), but to tell the truth I don't know exactly how to 
respond. I've always thought that my field was American Studies. 
I have published a little literary criticism; I didn't know that that 
was a bad thing to do. I like to think, moreover, that "even" my 
literary criticism has been informed by my training, reading and 
scholarship in other areas. I suppose I could, in self-defense, cite 
my education, if one defends oneself in such a way. At both Harvard 
and Brown, where I took my degrees, I took more history than 
anything else, so much that the History chairman at Kansas soon 
after I arrived in the late 50s told me I had more U.S. history 
training than anyone in his department; he was interested in getting 
me to teach history. I had nearly written a doctoral dissertation on 
a historical subject, have since taught U.S. history, was referred to 
as "the historian Stuart Levine" by a reviewer of a book I did with 
a group of mainly anthropologists, and am currently closest profes-
sionally to a couple of certified card-carrying historians who help 
me edit American Studies; I could go on. But to tell the truth, I 
don't think of myself as a historian any more than I do as a literary 
critic. I guess that I just don't get the drift of Mr. Segal's statements 
about my profession, unless he means that literary critics insist on 
evidence and analysis, while historians don't. I don't think he does, 
I don't think that's true, and I don't want to get snide. 
Until my graduate editorial assistant reminded me, I had forgot-
ten that the journal which I edit published a review of Technological 
Utopianism in its Fall 1985 number. What it says about the orga-
nization of the book is so close to my opinion that I quote parts of 
it to suggest that my reaction is not isolated. Paul Boyer calls it 
"this flawed but interesting little book." He concludes: 
Unfortunately, Technological Utopianism in American Culture adds up 
to somewhat less than the sum of its parts. Segal has already published 
thirteen articles on this subject (at least four of which form the basis of 
chapters in the present book), and the work at times seems more a dis-
jointed collection of essays than an integrated whole. The 163 pages of text 
are followed by a nine-page biographical appendix, eighty-two pages of 
closely printed notes and a thirty-three-page unannotated bibliography. 
Many of the notes are themselves mini-essays—interesting enough, but 
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frustrating to the reader seeking to grasp the work as a whole. But although 
the book is less satisfactory than one might have hoped, Segal's topic is 
manifestly an important one, and he has thoughtful and provocative things 
to say about it. 
I agree with all Mr. Boyer says, including what is positive. Indeed, 
I think that perhaps my over-all feeling toward the book is more 
favorable than his, and I am sure that Mr. Segal is misreading what 
I said. 
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